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Summary 
Non-state provision (NSP) of basic services is an important substitute for government 
services in most developing countries. The international policy environment favours the 
idea that service levels could be improved if government and non-state providers 
collaborated. This article examines the experience based on studies of basic education 
and healthcare, water and sanitation in six African and South Asian countries. It finds 
that, while policy is now generally in support of NSP, practice is more often unsupportive 
and relationships are surrounded by mistrust. The main providers of non-state services – 
local entrepreneurs, individual practitioners, community organisations and small NGOs – 
are largely absent from any dialogue with government. They are exposed to forms of 
regulation that are largely repressive and effectively designed to protect established 
interests. Nevertheless, the article identifies positive examples of alternative forms of 
regulation that advance improved service standards, of facilitation by large NGOs acting 
in an intermediary role in support of local actors, and of replicable forms of collaboration 
between government and non-state providers. 
 
Key words: Africa; South Asia; service provision; non-state providers; contracting, 
regulation 
 
The questions 
 
This article addresses the issue whether governments can engage with non-state 
providers in ways that increase and improve service provision to poor people. It seeks 
answers across the service sectors to three questions: What are the explanations of 
failed or non-supportive relationships? Under what circumstances may positive 
relationships occur? What are the policy implications? The article draws largely on the 
six country studies referred to in this Symposium’s introductory article (Batley et al 2004, 
Chowdhury et al 2004, Delay et al 2004, Kadzamira et al 2004, Larbi et al 2004, Moran 
et al 2004, Nair 2004) and on the other papers in this Symposium.  
 
The importance and variety of non-state provision 
 
Of the six countries covered by the research, non-state provision (NSP) of services to 
the poorer half of the population is important in all but South Africa. We cannot be 
confident about its size; one of the strongest indicators of the disengagement of 
governments from the non-state sector is that in none of the countries was there any 
systematic information on it.  However, our studies were able to obtain some indication 
of the scale of activity in each country. 
 
In South Africa, although the non-state sector is large in terms of its turnover and 
employment, its population coverage is small by comparison with that of the public 
sector and mainly focused on the wealthy population. Half of all health expenditure is in 
the private for-profit sector which serves less than a fifth of the population; and only just 
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over three percent of the population attends private schools. By contrast, in Nigeria and 
Malawi, Christian medical missions provide around 60 percent and 37 percent of 
healthcare services respectively, and in addition there is a myriad of for-profit providers. 
Faith-based organisations own the majority of schools in Malawi, although most are 
funded by the state and are closely integrated into the public system. In Nigeria mission 
schools were taken over by the state in the 1970s. Private for-profit schools are 
important in both countries, attend the needs of low-income as well as high income 
groups, and are growing. In Malawi, they account for about four percent of primary and 
40 percent of secondary schools; in Nigeria, the registered for-profit sector accounts for 
20 percent of primary schools in some states but there is a huge unknown, unregistered 
category, said to account for about 40 percent of the children in school in Lagos. Water 
and sanitation are formally provided by the state, but in Nigeria the majority of the rural 
population depends largely on household and community provision while, outside the 
large cities, the majority depend on water tankers, vendors and private boreholes. 
 
The South Asian countries present a similar pattern with a particular predominance of 
NSP in the health sector. Over two-thirds of Pakistani households use private health 
practitioners (a third of whom are unqualified); in Bangladesh, the proportion is 88 
percent. In India, although there is great variation between states, 80 percent of qualified 
allopathic doctors and 57 percent of hospitals operate privately, and non-allopathic 
medicine is almost entirely private. In all three countries the proportions using private 
health and education services is growing. In Pakistan and Bangladesh, at least a quarter 
of total school enrolment is in non-state schools, with the proportion reaching 55 percent 
in urban areas of Pakistan. In the case of Bangladesh, most of these are state-assisted 
community schools with teachers’ salaries paid by government. In the Punjab, Pakistan, 
two-thirds are for-profit schools which if they are registered receive limited help with tax, 
land and utility bills. In India too, there are private aided and unaided schools. As in the 
African countries, the majority of the rural population and around a third of the population 
of the larger cities do not have access to public piped water, but depend on private water 
vendors or on tube-wells managed by households, communities, NGOs or (particularly in 
India) government water agencies. According to the Pakistan Integrated Household 
Survey, 61 percent of all water systems are self-financed by individual households 
 
Whereas NSP in water and sanitation is largely for the poor and for areas beyond the 
reach of public systems, non-state health and education services address a broader 
span of consumers, except in South Africa where they offer mainly élite services. In the 
other countries, non-state health services are probably as likely to serve the poor as the 
rich; in Pakistan, even the most ‘vulnerable’ population was as likely as the better-off to 
use private healthcare but less likely to use non-state schools (CIET 2003). In Nigeria, 
Malawi and Bangladesh, although government remains the main provider of primary 
education to all groups including the poor, non-state schools, particularly the 
unregistered ones, also serve poor families.  
 
It is clear that NSP offers a spectrum of services in terms of quality. However, it is wrong 
to assume that the poor choose non-state provision simply for want of access to public 
services. Surveys in Pakistan have found that users report dissatisfaction with 
government services and greater satisfaction with non-state provision of healthcare, 
education and water supply (CIET 2003 and Planning Commission 2003). A report for 
Enugu State in Nigeria showed that non-state health services were preferred because 
they were often more convenient, more considerate and cheaper (McClean and Salui 
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2003); similar findings come from a survey of traditional birth attendants in Malawi (Lule 
and Ssembatya 1994).  
 
There is a great variety of types of provider. For-profit firms and individual entrepreneurs 
operate in health, education, water and sanitation, and are often the most abundant but 
least known category. Faith-based organisations and NGOs appear as direct providers 
in health and education, more rarely in water supply except as facilitators - though there 
is a church-based water and sanitation system in Malawi. Community and household 
provision is most prevalent in water and sanitation, although community organisations 
often also act as funders and managers of schools.  
 
The policy environment  
 
All six states formally espouse the principle of partnership with NGOs and the private 
sector. For example, the Nigerian National Policy on Education (1998) ‘welcomes the 
contributions of voluntary agencies, communities and private individuals in the 
establishment and management of primary schools’. The South African minister of 
finance noted that ‘the private sector is better able to deliver effective services, often 
because of the dynamics of competition or because it generally has advanced technical 
or risk management capacity’ (Republic of South Africa 2000). In Pakistan, the Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Paper emphasises the mobilisation of private resources and 
community participation in education, healthcare, water and sanitation. Indian national 
plans and sector policies since the 1990s have encouraged public-private collaboration 
with NGOs in health and education, with private health practitioners, and with NGOs, 
communities and private firms in water and sanitation.  
 
However, current policy commitments rest on layers of historical experience. While 
formal policy is now generally in support of NSP, practice at the point of implementation 
is more often unsupportive. The environment of non-state provision is typically one of 
policy unreliability and legal instability. The relationship is frequently beset by 
ambivalence and mutual mistrust, built on histories of policy change and rivalry. 
Underlying this is a real struggle for territory and for the control of scarce financial 
resources. 
 
A typical sketch history of state/non-state relations in service provision would go through 
the following stages: 
• A colonial period in which mission hospitals and schools were introduced for the 
indigenous population, combined with privileged government provision of health 
and infrastructure services for the colonial administration 
• An immediate post-independence assertion of the role of the state, leading to the 
establishment of state water supply and sanitation systems and, in cases such as 
Nigeria, Pakistan and Bangladesh in the 1960s and 1970s, to state expropriation 
of private and faith-based providers of education or, as in Malawi, to their 
incorporation through state funding. State health services were established but 
élite private provision also grew in the post-independence period. 
• Through the 1980s and beyond, the deterioration of public services and the 
inability of governments to maintain public spending. Most of our country studies 
describe a period of real decline in the quality of services and an increasing 
tendency for users to find their own solutions in private provision. A new low-
income private commercial sector burgeoned to fill the gap in state provision.  
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• The 1990s until the present can be characterised as a period of at least formal 
recognition of the case for ‘partnership’ with NGOs and the private sector, a 
policy which has been strongly backed by donors. Some governments – such as 
Nigeria and Malawi – have raised the possibility of churches re-adopting and 
funding schools and hospitals. In Pakistan, some schools were handed back to 
their previous owners in the 1980s and religious organisations were encouraged 
to take on new roles as service providers. 
 
The strongest lurches in the policy environment – from state takeover, to severe public 
service decline, through the incremental growth of market provision, to the advocacy of 
partnership can be seen in Nigeria and Pakistan. India, though reflecting all of these 
stages, shows a greater continuity - with the state remaining pre-eminent throughout but 
never acting wholly to suppress non-state provision. In Malawi, a similar pattern is 
mediated through the persistent relationship between the state and church provision, 
especially but not only in health and education. Bangladesh is characterised by the large 
scale of NGO activity, and by a small number of very large NGOs that work across 
sectors and channel donor funding to smaller organisations, in systems that have a high 
degree of autonomy from government. South Africa is, at the other extreme, where post-
apartheid governments have been committed to the strengthening of government-run 
public services and have been able largely to achieve this; here non-state provision for 
the poor is largely an adjunct to the public service.  
 
Even in the most institutionalised case – the relation between church and state in health 
and education provision in the African countries – there has been a constant shift in the 
rules of the game between collaboration, laissez-faire, incorporation and control. 
Probably the greatest ambivalence has been in the education sector where the state has 
sought but failed wholly to assert its dominance. In the health sector, given its complexity 
and multiplicity of providers, there was never a serious claim to universality of state 
provision. In water and sanitation, urban piped systems remain very largely under the 
control of public authorities, even if some provision is contracted out; wholly non-state 
provision is extensive in rural and poor urban areas, but not a preferred alternative. 
 
Policy dialogue 
 
Informal dialogue was always present in these policy environments. The survival and 
recent growth of the non-state sector has involved on-going interaction between 
government and NSPs. No doubt deals were done, permissions explicitly or implicitly 
given, relationships cultivated, mutual obligations and political or personal gains 
negotiated – often not at policy level but in trade-offs at the point of implementation. The 
Pakistan study describes 30 years of collaboration between the government of Azad 
Jammu and Kashmir with two NGOs (the Family Planning Association of Pakistan and 
the Marie Adelaide Leprosy Centre) in which the two sides slowly built up relations of 
confidence. A more nefarious sort of dialogue is thought to be maintained between 
associations of water tanker owners and city authorities in Karachi and Lagos to 
maintain inadequate piped water supplies. 
 
Associated with the principle of partnership is formal ‘policy dialogue’, a phrase that is 
most evident in donor-dependent countries. Donors, the World Bank and UN agencies 
advocate the participation in policy-making of civil society actors so as to maximise its 
reflection of the poor’s priorities. Specifically in relation to service provision, the idea is 
that complementarities can be found between the roles of government and non-state 
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providers (Wakefield 2004). Donor-inspired policy instruments such as poverty reduction 
strategies, the Education for All and Health for All agendas, and sector-wide approaches 
at national level have created frameworks for more open policy dialogue. 
 
The country studies show that formal opportunities for dialogue have indeed increased. 
However, as the articles by Palmer, Rose and Sansom in this Symposium indicate, 
these new more open encounters are often in practice limited in three senses. First, they 
take place at the policy design stage in set-piece events rather than in continuous 
interaction over policy implementation. Second, they often involve NSPs very cursorily. 
Thirdly, they typically include primarily the larger NGOs which have capacity to represent 
themselves in such events. A recurring theme is that large NGOs have taken advantage 
of donor processes to initiate dialogue and lobby for influence. Service providers have 
sometimes set up umbrella associations to represent their interests, but generally local 
level community organisations and individual entrepreneurs have little if any 
representation in such events. However, even where the formal dialogue remains 
limited, it can be argued that the promise of partnership and of participation in policy 
formation has contributed to a restructuring of the non-state sector’s relations with 
government, excluding some but creating new levels of organisation among others. 
 
Often the key participants in dialogue are organisations set up to act as advocates for 
the rights of the poor. For example, in direct response to donor language, in Bangladesh 
a Centre for Policy Dialogue was established, and in Nigeria a Grand Alliance for 
Poverty Reduction and a Civil Society Coalition on Education For All. In India, civil 
society engagement in policy dialogue is primarily by advocacy groups. Indeed, service 
providers are rarely the principal partners in dialogue forums and, where they are 
present, it is usually narrowly to defend their own interests rather than really to engage in 
policy dialogue. Umbrella organisations have been set up specifically to take on this role, 
including, for example, associations of private schools in South Africa, Nigeria, Malawi 
and India, an association of unregistered schools in Nigeria set up to resist the private 
schools’ lobbying for their closure, and a national association of medicine dealers in 
Nigeria. 
 
There are some positive but exceptional cases of high level policy dialogue. Palmer (in 
her article in this issue) cites national consultation processes on health policy in Nigeria, 
South Africa and Bangladesh which involved non-state providers. However, there was 
little evidence that high level planning had influenced policy as implemented.  
 
The regulatory framework 
 
Regulation provides the basis on which non-state service providers are prohibited, 
permitted or encouraged to operate. Broadly, there are two sorts of regulation: those that 
seek to suppress non-state activity and those that seek to promote its more efficient 
operation. Our research found a complex reality: governments argue for partnership 
while deploying regulations that are suppressive, but on the other hand the regulations 
are rarely actually applied. This creates a realm of uncertainty in which non-state 
providers operate without security or incentive to invest. This section outlines the main 
features of regulatory experience, and then identifies the features of relatively good 
practice. 
 
In health and education, regulation largely applies at the point of ‘entry’, in other words it 
is about the conditions under which providers register to practice. In the case of water 
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and sanitation, independent private provision is rarely formally recognised: if there is any 
regulation at all, it is about standards of practice rather than qualifications to practice.  
 
Registration procedures for private schools are always elaborate and onerous, while 
regulation of the public sector is often less severe. Rose’s article in this Symposium 
identifies ‘multiple layers of accountability’ in South Africa and multiple fees to different 
authorities in Nigeria. In all countries, the requirements for registration focus on inputs 
rather than the quality of educational outputs. Kardar (2001) has described the 
complexity of the private school registration requirements in Pakistan, and their 
irrelevance to any real concern with the quality of education. They require multiple 
information on school facilities and equipment (number of maps, blackboards, steel and 
wooden cupboards etc) but set and measure no standards of teaching quality. They rule 
on the level of fees and salaries, in spite of the fact that this is a highly competitive 
sector. In all countries, without registration, school students cannot sit the government 
matriculation exams. The opportunities for rent-seeking through harassment are high. 
Characteristic of registration requirements, in countries including South Africa, India, 
Pakistan and Bangladesh is that they restrict competition with the public sector: non-
state schools must maintain a certain distance from or get the permission of government 
schools.  
 
In the health sector, registration of practitioners is delegated to professional associations 
which effectively maintain barriers to entry, but leave untouched the much larger number 
of unqualified practitioners. In India, as elsewhere, state medical councils manage 
accreditation of individual practitioners but, in most states, there is no registration or 
regulation of private and voluntary hospitals or clinics. After registration, there is little 
attempt by professional councils to enforce standards or apply sanctions, and 
governments have rarely intervened to supervise professions’ regulatory practices. 
Professional councils act generally to defend members’ interests rather than the public 
interest. Exceptions were the pharmacy councils of South Africa and Nigeria which, 
subject to statutory requirements, have both achieved effective regulation of drug 
dispensaries. 
 
Whether there is elaborate and inappropriate entry regulation as in education or little if 
any in the case of water and sanitation, monitoring and control of the quality of 
performance is largely absent in all service sectors, except in South Africa. Entry 
standards have the effect of restricting formal permission to operate, and therefore also 
access to markets, subsidies and donor funding, but they rarely set a practicable basis 
on which standards of operation can be assessed. The non-state providers that are 
approved are then able to operate without regard to quality of output, while the 
unapproved continue to operate in any case. Apart form the inappropriateness of the 
rules, their non-application can be attributed to a combination of 
• The difficulty of assessing standards of operation of many small and often 
informal providers. On a scale of practicality, large-scale operators of water 
supply systems, hospitals and schools might be more easily regulated but even 
these are usually immune. 
• Incapacity of governments to regulate. As the earlier articles by Rose, Palmer 
and Sansom have shown, regulatory organisations generally lack staff, skills, 
enforcement powers, or information on the sector to be regulated. 
• The resistance of providers. In India ‘powerful medical lobbies have opposed the 
government’s efforts to regulate’ (Nair 2004:15). In Nigeria, provider associations, 
particularly in the water sector, were too powerful to control; approved schools 
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lobbied for unapproved schools to be closed while an association of unapproved 
schools successfully used political influence to resist this. 
• Avoidance by providers. In the face of burdensome rules, providers ignore 
regulations or circumvent them often finding it preferable to remain unrecognised. 
Where necessary, they manage to reconnect with the system, for example by 
sending children to recognised schools for public examinations. 
 
Bad regulation is worse than none.  On Pakistan, Kardar (2001:8) concludes: ‘Mercifully, 
the enforcement mechanisms are weak’. On Bangladesh, Delay et al (2004) conclude: 
‘One positive aspect of the lack of regulation is that non-state activities have more room 
in which to provide and to innovate’. However, our studies did find some relatively 
positive cases of government regulation, and some effective alternatives to it. 
 
South Africa’s process for registering NGOs adopts a model ‘light touch’ approach, in a 
conscious effort by the government to move away from the use of registration as a 
controlling device under apartheid. By comparison the Bangladesh NGO Affairs Bureau 
has powers (but not the human resources) to register, monitor and oversee all NGOs 
that receive foreign funding; although it lacks the human resources to fulfil the task 
comprehensively, the powers present the possibility of control.  
 
South Africa also offers examples of ‘regulation by facilitation’ (using incentives rather 
than penalties - see Palmer) across the health and education sectors. Registration and 
the monitoring of quality standards are rewarded by access to subsidies for primary 
schools and by continuing professional development for pharmacists. Another positive 
example of the use of incentives for regulation is the award of vouchers to pregnant 
women for use with accredited birth attendants in Bangladesh. Blantyre Water Board in 
Malawi supports the development of community water services but at the same time 
regulates them. However, the use of incentives (subsidies, tax waivers, land, training, 
etc) for registration can also draw service providers into systems of dysfunctional 
regulation. There is a possible link between large incentives and heavy regulation: 
Kerala State in India offers large subsidies for study in private schools in return for 
quality control, while Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamil Nadu are withdrawing 
grants-in-aid and removing restrictions on opening schools. 
 
Negative, anti-competitive regulation seems most often to occur in services where there 
is a direct government service to protect. It is noticeable that the most positive cases of 
effective regulation occurred in regard to drug vending, in which government has no 
direct stake, in South Africa and Nigeria. These also illustrate the case for the 
establishment of dedicated regulatory agencies that are at least semi-autonomous from 
government. In both, a government agency (the Medicine Control Council in South Africa 
and the National Agency for Food and Drug Administration and Control in Nigeria) has 
the statutory role of licensing drugs, while an independent pharmaceutical council 
supervises the licensing and monitoring of private drugs vendors. 
 
There are other models of effective regulation where the regulator has been divorced at 
least partly from the interests of the providers and also any predatory interest of 
government: 
 
External accreditation: The Pakistan Centre for Philanthropy has developed a 
certification regime for non-profit organisations. It sets standards of good internal 
governance, transparent financial management and effective programme delivery 
 8 
assessed by an independent panel. The purpose of its voluntary accreditation system is 
to strengthen the civil society sector by bridging the information and credibility gap that 
may exist between donors and recipients; but, of course, it tends to favour larger, formal 
organisations.  In Mumbai, India, a Health Care Accreditation Council has been set up to 
establish quality standards for small private hospitals, with representatives of owners, 
professional bodies, consumer organisations and NGOs. 
 
Franchise: In some cases, national NGOs act effectively as regulators of the quality of 
services provided by local level service deliverers. Social Marketing Pakistan offers 
family planning and reproductive health services by franchising private clinics and 
pharmacies which have the right to use the ‘Green Star’ franchise brand if they undergo 
training and maintain standards. Similarly, BRAC in Bangladesh sub-contracts local 
NGOs to deliver non-formal primary education programmes funded by donors, offering 
technical support and training and monitoring the sub-contractors’ progress. 
 
Community control: There are many examples where communities or client-users have 
become part of the process of regulation and monitoring of the performance of service 
providers. The Orangi Pilot Project in Karachi puts local sewers and water tanks under 
the direct financing and control of community groups, and subjects contractors to 
community monitoring. The BRAC model of community controlled schools, in 
Bangaldesh, has been adopted also in Pakistan in community schools supported by the 
Aga Khan and the National Rural Support Programmes, and in Malawi where the Save 
the Children Fund involves communities in the recruitment and discipline of teachers. 
However, Rose (in this Symposium) points out that, while local accountability seems to 
produce better results in school performance, it also presents dangers of local élite 
capture. 
 
Privatising regulation: The mayor of Jaranwala in Pakistan recognised the capacity limits 
of the municipal authority and engaged a private company to monitor the performance of 
other firms contracted to do local level works, such as drain-clearing. 
 
Facilitation of non-state providers 
 
There are scarce examples of sustained and effective government support for non-state 
service provision through, for example, finance, training, technical advice, or mobilisation 
of communities. Where such facilitation does function effectively it is often funded by 
donors, and operated not by government but by large NGOs. This is not surprising, given 
that most non-state provision has occurred in spite of or in the absence of government.  
 
In undertaking this research, we met widespread puzzlement on both sides at the idea 
that government might facilitate the non-state sector. Non-state providers regarded 
government with distrust and scepticism; governments usually felt that any available 
funding or support should go to state provision.  
 
In numerous cases where donor support has been channelled through government to 
NGOs or community organisations, resentment has grown up between government 
agencies obliged to part with the funds and the recipient organisations that fear the 
funding is being badly managed or at risk of being diverted. In Pakistan, semi-
governmental agencies set up with government endowments to allocate donor funding – 
such as the National Trust for Population Welfare, and health and education foundations 
– have rapidly dissipated their funds in an environment of bureaucratic management and 
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political intervention to the point that some can scarcely cover their own operating costs. 
Non-state providers dependent on government for funding, even when the resources 
originate with donors, typically experience great uncertainty. Where donor funding 
lapses, so too does the government facilitation - for example, of family planning 
association clinics in Pakistan and Malawi. In Nigeria, direct government support has 
proven almost wholly unreliable: the mission schools and hospitals were first absorbed 
by government before then losing their grants and salary subsidies in the 1990s.  
 
Nevertheless, there are some cases where government support has helped NSPs to 
deliver a sustained and significant service to poor people, without donors taking the lead. 
The Government of Malawi has maintained a continuous relationship of mutual support 
with the Christian mission hospitals. In Bangladesh registered non-government primary 
schools covering about a quarter of total enrolment receive government support in 
construction and equipment, training and salary payment of teachers. The State of 
Kerala, which has the highest proportion of private primary schools in India, has 
deliberately promoted competition in the education sector by providing scholarships and 
transportation subsidies that allow parents a real choice between private and public 
primary schools.  
 
However, the evidence of our six country studies is that large NGOs are better able than 
government to support service provision at local level, where this involves community 
contributions to the construction or management of facilities. Some have been able to 
sustain long-term relationships of trust with communities. Donors have often chosen to 
fund services through NGOs after having bad experience of funding through 
government.  
 
Large NGOs operating nationally have often mediated between donors or government 
and communities by working through affiliated local NGOs. Also in Pakistan, the Orangi 
Pilot Project has developed a model in Karachi that has been replicated in poor urban 
areas throughout the country: NGO facilitators support community groups in the 
development of low cost sewerage systems with the collaboration of public utility 
companies. In Bangladesh, BRAC’s non-formal primary education programme serves 
the most hard-to-reach population (with a particular focus on girls) operating largely 
independently of government. Directly and through sub-contracted local NGOs, BRAC 
supports community-managed education centres, recruiting and training teachers and 
monitoring their performance. In India, the Self-Employed Women’s Association 
facilitates community-based health insurance for the poor by mediating between 
communities and formal insurance companies. In several of these cases, large NGOs 
have piloted forms of service delivery that have then been adopted and replicated by 
government.  
 
Contracting and collaboration 
 
We will use three criteria to distinguish types of contract or agreement which are relevant 
to all services: 
1. organisational relationships range from loose understandings through formal 
agreements to tight contracts 
2. relationships may be hierarchical, where one partner acts as the agent of the 
other, or collaborative, for example in joint ventures or co-production 
3. the non-state provider may be financial autonomous or dependent.  
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Once again, positive experience is rather scarce.  
 
Tight, hierarchical contracts: Unclear specification of contractual requirements and poor 
monitoring by government apply even in the two stronger states – South Africa and India 
– and even in the water sector which should be more easily specifiable than health and 
education services. Requirements of water provision are relatively easily determined, 
quantified and measured by comparison with the more qualitative outputs of healthcare 
and education (Batley and Larbi 2004). However, in India, public-private water 
concession and franchise arrangements have largely failed or been abandoned in the 
face of weak political support, lack of contracting capacity and the non-viability of the 
terms offered to private providers. In South Africa, the Blue Dolphin water concession 
case was more positive – with strong political support and legal backing – but the local 
government managing the concession lacked the capacity to regulate the private 
contractor. 
 
More common were loose but hierarchical agreements where, in principle, the 
government was contracting a non-state partner but the ‘rules of engagement’ were 
unclear, not fully expressed in contractual terms, or not respected. The Riveroaks 
concession in Nigeria is producing cheaper water for more poor people in the Karu-
Mararaba area, but it was awarded without competition and is based on an unwritten 
understanding which leaves the powers of the regulator and the company unclear. In 
Pakistan, an important innovation in contracting out the management of 140 schools with 
97,000 pupils in Lahore to a local, private welfare trust (CARE) achieved a major 
improvement in schools’ infrastructure, numbers of teachers, and performance of 
teachers and pupils. However, CARE was plagued by lack of control over government 
teachers in the absence of a clear agreement with the Lahore city authorities. The 
question is whether arrangements with such in-built tensions are sustainable. 
 
There were also problems with loose agreements for collaboration where the partners 
operate on the basis of complementary contributions but without any clearly stated 
obligations. A major case is the relationship between the Government of Malawi and the 
Christian Hospitals Association of Malawi (CHAM).  The government is reliant on CHAM 
to provide services in areas where there are no government hospitals; CHAM depends 
on government to fund staff. They have operated for decades in principle on the basis of 
trust, but in practice clouded by suspicion about the fulfilment of obligations, sources and 
amounts of funding, and the relative benefits of government and CHAM officials. In 
Malawi, as in several other African countries, this has led to moves to establish 
transparent service agreements. 
 
The CHAM service agreements are an attempt to ‘tighten’ the understanding between 
government and the hospitals about what services should be provided at what level of 
user fee (or free), in return for government payment of salaries. This is a move from a 
loose partnership towards a tighter and more hierarchic contract, recognising the 
hospitals’ financial dependence. Similarly, the South African national and provincial 
departments of health are seeking to move towards a more formalised agreement with 
the many (around 800) home-based care organisations that support people with 
HIV/AIDS. The HBC providers are mainly NGOs and community groups but also faith-
based organisations and hospices; many are small, informal and voluntary, receiving 
most of their funding from the state. Government has tried to formalise the arrangement, 
normally expecting HBC providers to have a clear legal status, and creating a standard 
contract and guidelines for their organisational structure and functioning, in order to 
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guarantee a proper standard of service. However, in both the CHAM and HBC cases, 
tightening the contractual arrangements has a consequence in putting new burdens on 
limited state capacity to monitor contract fulfilment and, in the HBC case, in making it 
difficult to include informal providers.  
 
Donor-led projects provide several successful examples of tight hierarchic contracting, 
but often only for the duration of the project – given that normal systems are bypassed 
and funding depends on donors. For example, the Asian Development Bank has funded 
an urban primary health care project that covers the slums of the four main cities of 
Bangladesh managed by a special project implementation unit in Dhaka City 
Corporation. A competitive contracting process led to the drawing up of nine 
performance-related contracts with NGOs. An effective monitoring system was set up, 
and performance was found to improve in terms of cost, quality, coverage and 
accessibility of services. The city corporations participated in the process, but there was 
little direct capacity-building, and the second stage of the project seems likely to proceed 
on the basis that government will contract an implementing agency, rather than directly 
contract the providers. In Bangladesh donors have placed more faith in institutionalising 
and scaling-up non-state service delivery through umbrella contracts to major NGOs, 
and particularly to BRAC for non-formal primary education.  
 
Tight, hierarchic contracting seems to work under special conditions: the contractual 
terms are clear, there is capacity of design and implementation on the part of those who 
award and hold contracts, there is adequate trust between the two parties, the contract 
awarder controls the sources of funding, and the contract holder has a clear legal status. 
An alternative is collaborative partnership, which depends on accumulated social capital 
but is technically less demanding. Here government and non-government partners make 
separately funded contributions and neither stands in authority over the other. We will 
briefly describe two possibilities: joint venture and co-production with communities, 
distinguishing between these on the basis that  
• a joint venture is a formal agreement (memorandum of understanding or 
contract) between  formally constituted organisations 
• co-production with communities is an informal agreement between formal 
organisations and communities or service recipients1. 
 
Two cases that may be described as joint ventures are described in the article by 
Palmer.  The Government of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK), in Pakistan, collaborates 
on the basis of memoranda of understanding with two large, national, but internationally 
connected, NGOs: the Family Planning Association of Pakistan (FPAP) and the Marie 
Adelaide Leprosy Centre (MALC). The collaboration was initiated by the NGOs and 
partly funded by the World Bank, but the government and the NGOs also brought their 
own financial and human resources. The NGOs provide services, support and develop 
government staff, and operate through government facilities rather than setting up rival 
systems. Each party is powerful enough to retain its autonomy. In India, there are 
examples of collaboration between state governments, donors, international and national 
NGOs together with community organisations to provide local level water and sanitation 
services. Tripartite agreements have been made where donors and international NGOs 
provide funds and technical expertise; the state government provides funds and policy 
                                                          
1 We recognise that this is a more limited and specific definition than used by Ostrom 1997 for whom the 
central point of co-production is that no single principal is in control of all inputs to produce a service output, 
that production involves multiple public and private agencies including recipients/citizens. 
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and administrative support; local NGOs support communities in construction; and 
community water and sanitation committees take on management and maintenance.  
 
Water and sanitation are rich in cases of co-production with communities of service 
recipients, and can present possibilities of scaling-up. One of the best know cases is the 
Orangi Pilot Project (OPP) in Pakistan, where public utilities provide large sewers in 
agreement with community lane committees fund and develop local sanitation systems, 
facilitated by an experienced local NGO. The model has been replicated from Karachi to 
some other cities, usually with the support of the originating NGO – the OPP’s Research 
and Training Institute.  In Bangladesh, an NGO - the Village Education Resource Centre 
(VERC) - also without offering subsidies, has facilitated the extension of sanitation in 
villages by helping to make people aware of health issues; community groups build and 
maintain latrines; and local entrepreneurs make slabs and plastic pans using moulds 
provided by VERC. This model has been replicated by other NGOs, and the government 
has advocated the approach to local government. In other countries – Nigeria and 
Malawi – schemes exist where the government joint funds the development of water and 
sanitation facilities with local community associations which contribute funding and take 
on the ownership and management of water and sanitation facilities – but these depend 
on donor support and on the capacity of government to undertake the facilitation role.  
 
What is distinctive about the Pakistani and Bangladeshi cases of co-production is that 
they seem to offer greater promise of scale and sustainability for three main reasons: 
they do not depend on external subsidy, the schemes have become institutionalised in 
the practice of local NGOs, and they are scaled-up not through large organisational 
structures but by replication of a model. The fact that the strongest examples of 
community co-production exist in water and sanitation probably relates to the fact that 
infrastructure has relatively lighter professional maintenance and management 
requirements by comparison with health and education, and local level systems are 
technically not complex. Moreover, everybody in a neighbourhood has day to day 
experience of water and sanitation (deficiencies) in a way that is more pervasive than in 
the case of the other service sectors.  
 
Policy conclusions 
 
Non-state provision of basic services is a large and often predominant fact of life for poor 
as well as non-poor people. In some respects, donors’ widespread concern with ‘scaling-
up’ seems a little off-track: NSP already fills much of the gap in the quantity if not quality 
of state provision. At least until government can provide more comprehensive and better 
services, what needs greatly to be improved is the level of collaboration between 
government and NSP.  
 
It is not enough for donors to seek policy statements of governments’ readiness to 
collaborate with the non-state sector; such statements are readily forthcoming. Formal 
policy dialogue typically engages at the level of policy design in set-piece events with 
large NGOs and advocacy organisations. The direct providers of services to the poor: 
community organisations, small NGOs and entrepreneurs are largely excluded from 
such events. What is missing is engagement between government and the non-state 
sector at the operational level; this is where the history of distrust and rivalry frustrates 
policy intent.  
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There are cases of effective (pro-service) regulation by government but the general 
lessons are that it can only work where the regulator has information, is capable of 
enforcing standards and has no incentive to repress non-state providers, and where 
providers have incentives to comply. Government regulation is only desirable when it is 
slimmed down and re-directed from the control of service inputs to monitoring and 
supporting the quality of outputs. Awareness and capacity to regulate in this positive 
sense need to be developed. More likely alternatives to government regulation, 
particularly where capacity and understanding are limited, are external accreditation, 
contracted out regulation, franchise of local providers by NGOs and private firms with a 
reputation to defend, and community monitoring.  
 
Governments may be able to create a facilitating environment for non-state provision at 
a very broad level - with stable legal frameworks and access to generic subsidies for 
salaries and other core costs. But where it comes to working empathetically with 
communities and reacting sensitively to local realities, the more likely model is of large 
NGOs mediating between government/donors and local NGOs/CBOs, and offering 
technical support to the latter. 
 
Tight contractual arrangements between government and non-state providers present 
challenges to government’s capacity for contract design and implementation, and tend to 
rule out the local and informal providers that are often most important to poorer people. 
On the other hand over-loose partnerships create confusion and conflict about roles and 
responsibilities. Joint ventures of government with non-state providers and co-production 
with service recipients present the possibility of clearly stating the roles of the partners 
without subordinating one to the other. They allow the scaling-up organised service 
provision, not by creating massive organisations but by disseminating replicable models 
of collaboration.  
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